Introduction
It is often claimed that the ageing process that many industrialized countries have undergone for decades-and will continue to undergo-puts social security systems more and more under financial pressure. Under a constant policy, such as a constant income-replacement rate and a constant subsidy rate, this holds simply because double ageing affects the relation between the working and the non-working population. If social security benefits, pensions especially, are financed by the pay-as-you-go method (PAYGO) rather than being fully funded, changes in the pensioners-to-contributors ratio translate into increases in the contribution rate (Börsch-Supan, 1992; Febrero & Cadarso, 2006) . The diagnosis may culminate in making the case for a system that is likely to burden future generations overproportionally because of its sensitivity to changes in demographic parameters. Thus, postponing financing burdens into the future, which the PAYGO system does, implies intergenerational redistribution that hurts future contributors and pensioners by reducing the implicit rate of return, which they can earn (Galasso & Profeta, 2004) . For Germany, there are only a few recent studies that empirically assess implicit rates of return in the PAYGO system for different cohorts. Schnabel (1998) , for instance, finds that rates of return decreased between 1930 and 1980 over cohorts; in an optimistic scenario, a single male born in 1930 could expect a rate of return of 2.1 per cent, while a single male born in 1980 could expect a rate of return of -0.4 per cent. Evidence from Börsch-Supan and Reil-Held (2001) also highlights decreasing implicit rates of return over time. Others claim that the problem is not how the PAYGO mechanism works-that there is no technical weakness at all. The problem, rather, is in the political economy of the system. Short-run oriented and vote-maximizing politicians, who ought to adjust the economy to long-run challenges, actually resist certain reforms (reducing the replacement rate, raising the legal retirement age, or neutralising adverse incentives to retire earlier). The bottom line is that policy makers are aware of PAYGO-related reform measures that would, among other things, take pressure off the contribution rate, but they choose not to implement them (Casamatta et al., 2000; Galasso & Profeta, 2004; Galasso, 2008) . Another point of view is that it is all a matter of economic progess and productivity growth: If governments' economic policy would create an environment that is investment-and innovation-friendly as well as competitive, and, perhaps, induce further economic activity by stimulating demand, industrialised countries should be able to eliminate the financing problems related to their social security systems (Concialdi, 2006; Wray, 2006) . This paper aims to contribute to the literature on the weakness (alleged, perhaps) of modern PAYGO social security systems in financing pensions by taking a business and economic historical perspective on the issue. This undertaking has potential since the PAYGO pension insurance system has a quite long tradition, at least in Germany. Knappschaften (singular Knappschaft), the mutual insurance funds of German miners, provide the historical context for this paper. 1 In particular, I focus on the business history of all 103 Prussian
Knappschaften, the most important, and comparatively best-documented funds. The study period covers the years 1854 to 1913, the formative period of the German welfare state.
Because it was in 1854 that the miners' Knappschaften took on the character of insurance funds thanks to liberal Prussian mining reform, this year seems to be a natural starting point.
The beginning of the First World War seems to be a natural end point for this study. Note: Survivors are widows and orphans.
Source: Ministerium für Handel und Gewerbe (1862 Gewerbe ( -1915 .
What makes the Knappschaften an appropriate historical example? What is the research question this paper wants to answer specifically by focusing on them? Concerning the first question, the Knappschaften insured miners against the major life risks-including sickness, invalidity, and survivorship-and granted sick pay and pensions as their main insurance benefits. One may argue that invalidity insurance is not old-age insurance and, thus, may not be subject to the same problems. However, I argue that this distinction does not matter in this particular case because both invalidity pensions and survivorship pensions were paid until death of the pensioner, hence implicitly insured them against longevity. Knappschaften used the PAYGO mechanism, and membership and payments of contributions were compulsory, with each Knappschaft having its own PAYGO equation to react on. They also accumulated reserves, but these were never sufficient to cover a substantial amount of the implicit liabilities. In fact, there is reason to conclude that Knappschaften were under massive pressure from a continuously rising proportion of pensioners, who were economically dependent individuals. Figure 1 conveys a first impression of what was going on. The average number of invalids (survivors) per 100 contributors per Knappschaft increased from about four (14) dependent retirees to 14 (more than 25), or by 357 (at least 181) per cent.
Concerning the second question, this paper focuses on the extent to which the Knappschaften's business policy might have been intergenerationally imbalanced in view of the pressure on the PAYGO equation illustrated above. The research question is: Did implicit rates of return, which were the dividends the Knappschaften paid their insurants, decrease over time? According to Börsch-Supan and Reil-Held (2001) , intergenerational balance may be achieved if implicit rates of return remain the same for each birth-cohort. Therefore my hypothesis is that the Knappschaften's PAYGO system led to diminishing implicit rates of return, thus raising intergenerational redistribution to the detriment of future miners. This hypothesis refers primarily to the claim that the PAYGO mechanism is weak because of its general sensitivity to demographic changes in the broadest sense. Below, however, I will show that this framework can also link up with the two other claims described above: the 'political economy claim' and the 'growth claim.'
This paper does not argue that the conditions in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries for Knappschaften were the same as for today's industrialised economies' social security systems. Since the Knappschaften were job-related, mining-specific factors were important sources of financial challenges (e.g., financial shocks due to massive accidents; structural decline of a mining area and, thus, exhaustion of resource deposits; and worsening geological conditions because of an increasing average depth). Nonetheless, the Knappschaften's members might have also experienced increases in life expectancy, for instance, as did the population as a whole at the time. Indeed, this paper identifies a parallel to modern economies in the fundamental economic problem of adjusting finances via the PAYGO mechanism as a reaction to exogenous or endogenous shocks in the form of rising pensioners-to-contributors ratios.
The Knappschaft is an old institution and a neglected field of research in business and economic history. Thus, telling a story about German Knappschaften may be a valuable undertaking simply because they remain an unknown piece of German insurance history. The
Knappschaften have significance as one of the job-related origins of Bismarckian-style compulsory health and pension insurance and-indirectly-of every related social insurance system today (Wagner-Braun, 2002, pp. 28-32; Bartels et al., 2009 , Guinnane & Streb, 2009 This paper does contain links to business history and the business history literature. To begin with, from a formal point of view, it uses firm-level data and, thus, assesses a problem-the sustainability of PAYGO systems-at the micro level that is usually, at least in my perception, understood as a problem mattering on the marcroeconomic level. What is more, Knappschaften were shaped to a considerable extent by government regulations, which converted them into a kind of job-related social insurance. The Knappschaften, however, were mutual insurance funds operating not for profit and independent of each other; and-this is probably the most important point-they imply collective solidarity. Though the quality of 'compulsory solidarity' might have been different from that of pure voluntary solidarity, as in the Friendly Societies (Guinanne & Streb, 2009, p.10; Pearson, 2003, p. 51) , this solidarity was going to be tested towards 1913. Hence, referring to Pearson (2002) , for example, the Knappschaftens' story might be seen as another case of 'mutuality tested', yet in a different insurance context. There is also a link with the story of English pit clubs (Benson, 2002) .
Benson argues that it was a general problem for those clubs' solvency that they were tied to a particular mine and, thus, mine owner. The German miners' Knappschaft system was different in that many funds covered a whole mining area and were, thus, arguably less exposed to the fate and interests of only one owner. Whether those larger funds could better maintain their solvency, however, must be determined empirically.
The research question is answered in three consecutive steps. First, I sketch the history of the Knappschaften from their beginnings in the mediaeval period (around 1260) to the Prussian mining reform, 1851-1865, followed by a basic description of how they were regulated. The latter, in particular, seems necessary because, as mentioned before, the German miners' Knappschaften have been quite neglected in the (English-speaking) literature.
Second, I analyse the quality of the Knappschaften's exposure to financial challenges in more detail. Here, the focus on Prussian Knappschaften is justified for two reasons: i) Because
Prussia was the core region of mining activity in the study period, it accounted for the vast majority of miners; and ii) the Prussian ministry of trade and commerce reported annually, beginning in 1861, the balance sheets and membership composition of all Knappschaften there (Statistik der Knappschaftsvereine des preussischen Staates, KV statistics hereafter).
These data provide insights into the Knappschaften's operation. Finally, as a third step, I
present implicit rates of return for a number of Knappschaften and clarify their implications for intergenerational imbalance.
The Knappschaften and their economic niche: industry-related insurance
In mediaeval times, German miners relied on their own structures of mutual self-help in case of income loss due to injury, sickness and permanent incapacitation of the breadwinner (Lauf, 2004, p. 115; Bartels et al., 2009, p. 197 (Brassert, 1858; Hiltrop, 1869; Karwehl, 1907, p. 15-17) . After the miners' KVs had been incorporated into the absolutistic regime that emerged around middle of the sixteenth century, patronage by the sovereign became a substitute for miners' fraternalism. Since it was a characteristic of the absolutist-mercantilist state to administer the exploitation of natural resources in every respect, miners and mine owners were, in fact, at the royal administration's mercy (Kaufhold, 1994) . It was during the eighteenth century that Prussia, with its hard-coal deposits, emerged as the new mining core region (Bülow, 1905, pp. 34-62; Bartels et al., 2009, p. 198; Tenfelde, 2004, p. 21 ). In addition, Prussia's mining legislation of 1851-1865 removed the absolutist-mercantilist economic order in favour of a more liberal economic framework, allowing mine owners a free hand in all business-related decisions and converting the KVs from charitable organizations into insurance providers. The state resumed the position of a passive supervisor (Brown, 1995; Fischer, 1961a; Fischer, 1961b The various Prussian KVs were located in so-called mining administration regions (Oberbergamtsbezirke). Source: Bergamt Halle (1998), p. 29; Fürer (1988), p. 17; Oberbergamt Bonn, (1966), p. 22; Schelter (1992) , p. 505-510; the map has been constructed by Nolan Ritter (RWI).
Principally, we have to distinguish two different types of funds. The one, more frequently occurring, is the area Knappschaft (Bezirksknappschaft) that operated an insurance scheme contingent on the number and size of the mining enterprises located within the boundaries of its area. The other was the firm-related one (Werksknappschaft), usually situated within the area of another KV and, because of the linkage to a single company, comparatively smaller.
Linking particular KVs to certain areas is somehow reminiscent of assigning territorial monopolies (such as the large German energy suppliers in the second half of the twentieth century). This is the more so because no KV could have had a subsidiary within another's area. Consequently, competition was not seen in the free movement of services by KVs, butif at all-in the mobility of insurants.
Each KV insured its members-miners and their dependants-against the financial consequences of the contingencies of life: injuries, sickness, invalidity, survivorship, and old age. The respective prescribed benefits included: (1) health care benefits for medical treatment and health resort attendance (usually provided for the family, as well); (2) sick pay for every day on leave; (3) an invalidity pension until death; (4) funeral benefits; (5) a widow's pension until death or remarriage; and (6) and an orphan's pension until the age of 14. This article focuses, of course, on (3), leaving out the other benefit categories for the most part. Regarding the level of the invalidity pension benefit, KVs had a free hand in specifying amounts and calculation principles. The industry regulator did not even set minimum monetary standards or eligibility criteria. The fact that KVs had so much room to maneuver explains most of the heterogeneity among them. Invalidity pensions predominantly consisted of a flat rate, varying in its level between KVs and interpretable as a minimum pension, plus build-up rates for each contribution period during employment (week, month or year). These rates often depended on the classification of the miner according to his length of service, wage, or occupation within the mine; build-up rates also varied across insurers. In particular, there is no indication that KVs directly indexed pensions, once granted, to price inflation or productivity; a miner receiving a nominal annual pension of 100 marks in one year would most likely have received those 100 marks also in the subsequent years. 4 Each KV could decide about eligibility rules autonomously. However, the widespread criterion to qualify for an invalidity pension was simply the inability to work as a miner, meaning that the miner could no longer earn one half of his actual wage in his occupation in the mining sector. In contrast, Bismarckian invalidity insurance (introduced in 1889) granted pensions if the employee was no longer able to earn one sixth of his average wage of the preceding five years and one sixth of the average wage in his particular job. Thus, the KVs' eligibility criteria can be labelled, by and large, as comparatively less strict (Geyer, 1990; Frerich & Frey, 1993, p. 100). Finally, survivors' pensions were usually specified as a proportion of invalidity pensions (often 50 to 60 per cent for the widow's pension and ten to 20 per cent for the orphan's).
Regarding revenues, KVs financed themselves mainly through contributions, but also through interest on assets and various fees (e.g., entrance, punishment, and marriage fees).
They were allowed to charge a payment of contribution either as a fixed amount per contributor or as a percentage of labour income. We know from contemporary observers that KVs predominantly charged a fixed amount per period (week, month or year). This was either the same for every contributor regardless of individual characteristics, such as seniority, biological age, occupation within the mine (e.g., hewer underground or assistant worker at the surface) or wage class, respectively, or was scaled according to one or more of these individual characteristics. How a particular KV actually scaled contributions and dues was was decided only by the KV members' representatives in self-management (and not according to what the mining administration might have wanted) and was published in the KV's statute.
However, this article does not use detailed KV-level information on scaling. Like compulsion and local organization of KVs, shared financing between mineworkers and mine owners had a long tradition, too. The law of 1865 prescribed that employers had to pay a minimum of 50 per cent of the contributions mineworkers paid. Thus, financing was not necessarily on equal terms; the average firms' portion of total contributions over all KVs was, thus, less than 50 per cent. However, in 1906, the firms' obligatory portion was increased to the same amount mineworkers had to pay on aggregate.
Finally, the way the KVs self-management really worked in practice-thus how the parties involved influenced the decision-making process-is kind of a black box. claim that mine owners, via their representatives, constantly had relatively stronger influence in self-management. The miners' chosen representatives were usually said to be friendlier toward their bosses-the mine owners-than to the miners they were elected to represent. The Elders, as intermediaries, are said to have made the difference in favour of a stronger position of employers in self-management (Tenfelde, 2004, pp. 26-33) . According to Lauf (2006, p. 272), it is not surprising that owners dominated the decision process effectively because they were the intellectuals. Heinrich Imbusch (1910, p. 63) , who became the trade union leader of the Gewerkverein christlicher Bergarbeiter in 1918, stressed that many mine owners intended to use KVs to monitor and discipline their workforce: "Many employers saw in the KVs an instrument to pursue their own interests. The KVs' and, thus, the workers' interests had to be subordinated to owners' intentions." 5 Ferdinand Bertrams (1912 , p. 1413 points to the fact that mine owners had an interest in establishing a settled-that is, immobile-stock of experienced miners. This makes sense, as working as a productive hewer at the time, and probably still today, required a learning-by-doing process; taking a young, inexperienced miner to his most productive level was, thus, a costly investment for the mine owner. So, no mine owner would have been willing to develop a productive worker, only to lose him to another mine owner, which would have felt to him like an expropriation of future returns.
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have not yet been able to locate source material on board meetings. Contemporary observers are also not very informative about how decisions on contributions and benefits were made and justified. However, we can be quite sure that KVs ran an expenditure-oriented revenue policy; that is, they specified, for a given time interval, the monetary level of benefits and formed in some (yet unknown) way expectations on aggregate claims costs, which were converted into an average contribution required; they also accounted for expected miscellaneous revenues and room for maneuver because of accumulated reserves. That is to say, we can assess how average contributions and average benefits were effectively adjusted from an historical perspective because we have the quantitative data from the KV statistics.
What are harder to assess are the underlying ideas and the actuarial knowledge used. 6 Having seen this basic information on the institutional design of the Knappschaften, we can now look at Table 2 , which reports some more key data on Prussian KVs as a whole, highlighting secular trends in the study period. While the number of KVs decreased towards World War I, the total number of insurants-contributors and pensioners together-increased notably from 140,000 to 965,000, or by 3.78 per cent per year. As a measure of the KVs' social significance, the share of total members in the German population is employed.
Coverage increased from a mere 0.37 per cent to roughly 1.5 per cent; although this was not really high in the national context, it nonetheless increased, too. Moreover, the rising total membership in combination with a decreasing number of insurance funds implies that fund size must have grown increasingly large, on average. Here, I measure the size of a KV in terms of contributing miners exclusively. I thereby measure the true financing power a KV had by relying on a certain number of payers. Displayed are mean KV size and median KV size. Both measures are proposed in the literature as practical proxies for the minimum efficient size of an insurer (Eisen, 1991) . Mean size increased from 1,675 contributors per KV to about 12,000, while median size increased only from 449 contributors per KV to 1,300.
The difference between the two measures is a straightforward indicator of how skewed the annual KV size distribution was; here, it implies a right-hand tail. The table, moreover, shows that real pension costs increased in absolute terms as well as in relation to real net national product (NNP); the latter observation implies benefit growth at a higher rate than that of the whole economy and, thus, tells of the prosperity in the German mining sector at the time. Before 1908, real total assets displayed relate to the KVs' pension and sickness insurance sections together. Assets include cash reserves, bank deposits and fixed-interest-bearing papers.
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The case for financial pressure
The relevant regulations for KVs, the laws of 1854 and 1865, did not prescribe whether KVs should use the PAYGO method (Umlageverfahren) or funding (Kapitaldeckung).
Contemporaries inform us that KVs used the former, thus converting in each year the contributions of working members into pension benefits for non-working invalids and survivors, while private life insurers concentrated on the latter (Caron, 1882, p. 7; Bertrams, 1912 Bertrams, , p. 1417 Köhne, 1915, pp. 18-19 The often-claimed sensitivity of a PAYGO system simply stems from the fact that a change in the relation between the number of pensioners and the number of contributors requires a proportional change in the contribution rate, other things being equal. This can be easily verified by a look at the stylized budget equation of a PAYGO system, which is Contribution rate = (pensioners/contributors) * (average pension/average wage) * (1-a).
Mechanically, the contribution rate depends on three factors: i) the pensioners-to-contributors ratio (PCR); ii) the gross pension level (ratio of average pension to average wage, GPL); and iii) the degree of subsidisation from the outside (Schmähl, 2001) . KVs never received subsidies from the state or other KVs. Instead each KV, small or large, had financial reserves accumulated from past contributions, for example, that were charged ex ante but not required ex post to settle claims. To draw on reserves created in the past could help keep contributions and benefit levels constant, at least for some years.
Let us have a closer look at the development of economic dependency-that is, the development of the KVs' pensioners-to-contributors ratios. It seems reasonable here to take into account two facts that might have impliciations for the degree of adjustment pressure.
The first is: KVs had three sorts of pensioners to support; invalid miners, widows, and orphans. Hence, it makes sense to distinguish between an invalids-to-contributors ratio and a survivors-to-contributors ratio simply because one invalid was usually twice as costly as a widow and six times as costly as an orphan. The second is: The long-term growth performance of KVs is ambivalent. Some were subject to long-term stagnation and shrinkage, while other funds prospered and grew; this was very probably so because each KV was tied either to one mining area, which could be subject to exhaustion and structural decline over time, or to the fate of one mining firm. between small stagnant KVs, small dynamic KVs and so on also enables us to assess the claim that sustained positive growth might improve things; actually, it is not the growth of the economy that is addressed here, but the idea that sustained growth in contributors helps keep financing problems to a minimum. 
Sum 40 63
Note: KV size is measured in terms of contributors.
Source: See Figure 1 .
According to combinations of long-term growth patterns and size classes (stagnant large is omitted because only one KV is involved), Table 4 Note: 'ICR' ('SCR') denotes the invalids-to-contributors ratio (survivors-to-contributors ratio). Both ratios say how many pensioners of the respective category had to be financed by ten contributors. The ratios are averaged over KVs in year t.
Source: See Table 2 .
Was a rising burden from pensioners a true problem or only a kind of illusion? I ask this because one might claim that there is an implicit relationship between the pensioners-tocontributors ratio and productivity or wages, respectively (Verdugo, 2006) . If the working members' wages increased at a higher rate than did the contributions, an increasing pensioners-to-contributors ratio would not have been alarming, at least not from our ex post perspective. while that of the average pension was 1.79 per cent. Thus, the adjustment of the invalidity pension benefit was broadly linked to wages, even though with a time lag and not directly via the typical pension formula (see above). Moreover, the average contribution charged per year increased at a higher annual rate-by 2.78 per cent-implying that miners who entered later shouldered a comparatively faster-increasing portion of contributions. These two observations do not necessarily apply to a high number of KVs, but to a high number of miners. This is because contributions and pensions are size-weighted, and the size distribution of KVs was extremely skewed to the left with a long right-hand tail.
What about the reactions to the widespread phenomenon of a rising burden from pensioners? To give an answer, Table 5 reports indices of the (non-weighted) average contribution rate and the (non-weighted) average net pension level (NPL) for combinations of long-term growth pattern and size class; absolute quantities are also given for the years 1861 and 1913. In contrast to Figure 2 , where Hoffmann's wage series for the whole mining sector (including salines) was used, I try, as often as possible, to ascribe to each KV a wage series corresponding to the main product that was extracted in its area or by the relevant firm(s) (e.g., coal or ore), respectively. I use the Statistische Mitteilungen über die beim Bergbau
Preußens gezahlten Arbeitslöhne und erzielten Arbeitsleistungen, a statistics framework reporting annual net wage by product and mining area (e.g., hard coal in the Ruhr, brown coal in the Harz region, and iron ore in the Mansfeld mining area). In addition, I use Banken's (1997, appendix 5.4.2) wage series with respect to hard coal mining in the Saar and Holtfrerich's (1973, pp.54-56) wage series with respect to hard coal mining in the Ruhr.
Unfortunately, the official wage statistics do not report wage with respect to the related industries (smelting); therefore, I use Hoffmann's wage series on foundries (1965, pp. 468-470) . What is more, the official wage statistics also do not report wages for workers in quarries and those employed in salt mining; here, I draw again on Hoffmann's wage series on German mining as a whole. Not many KVs chose to specify a contribution rate rather than a fixed amount in marks per capita. However, knowing the average net labour earnings for miners enables us to convert the average contribution to a rate per year.
In 1882, contemporary observer Albert Caron asserted:
The fact that it is impossible to sustain high pensions with [such] low contributions is irrevocable. It seems reasonable for a KV to be able to grant smaller pensions that are safe for all times, but to finance the good situation at the moment by burdening the future even more.
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Evidence in Table 5 supports this view. At the start of the miners' insurance system, all KVs granted, on average, an NPL that was higher in the cases of small and medium stagnant and small dynamic KVs, even much higher than that in 1913. The NPL is an integral part of the PAYGO equation and can be interpreted as the income replacement of the pension benefit in the transition from the last year of employment to the first year of retirement (not to be confused with the lifetime replacement rate; see Whitehouse, 2006) . For the time, a replacement rate of 26 per cent was extremely high. Note that in the Bismarckian invalidity insurance, the replacement rate persistently amounted to about 17 per cent before 1913 (Frerich & Frey, 1993) . 13 The obvious message of Table 5 is: KVs could not, on average, sustain what they had promised; even if the average pension in marks had been raised over time, the net pension level could not be kept constant. This is why it should not be surprising that small and medium stagnant, as well as small dynamic, KVs could afford to reduce the contribution rate over time-the NPL was reduced even more. It seems as if prospering medium and large KVs could keep their NPL adjustments moderate over time because they either raised or held the contribution rate constant, respectively. Here, a parallel to the 'political economy claim' can be drawn. While there were no political forces implementing or blocking parametrical reforms (e.g., raising the contribution rate or raising the legal retirement age) or structural reforms (e.g., shift to funding), there were mine owners; they were the ones who arguably dominated the KVs' boards and consequently the decision-making process. A contribution rate under pressure from a rising proportion of pensioners is a potential cost factor for mine owners-even more so if the owners' profits were eroding due to diminishing output from mines near economic or technical exhaustion. An owner would arguably want to save costs in this situation, and contributions to the KVs were costs. In the absence of any constraint on parametrical reform (e.g., a politically guaranteed pension level, as in Germany), we observe that both the contribution rate and pension level served as the adjusting screw. Especially, the net pension level was decreased. This was, of course, not in the interest of old contributors on the verge of being retired and of pensioners. Obviously, they failed to prevent it. Caron tackled the question of what financial sustainability might be in the context of pension provision (again, it makes no difference for this matter that we focus on invalidity rather than old-age pension). Caron (1882, p. 19 ) substantiates his opinion:
[A KVs' respective performance] is not being able to finance pensions in some years.
KVs are rather able to finance pensions at any point in time only if it is clear that they can always grant the same amount of pensions per capita. Otherwise, present pensioners would benefit to the detriment of future pensioners.
14 There lies some truth in his assessment that is hard to deny: A pension system might be called sustainable if it ensures indefinitely that financing burdens are not transferred in either direction, from present to future or from future to present generations. However, there is also a misinterpretation in his assessment: It is not the absolute amount of the average pension that matters, but the replacement rate. In my perception, contemporary observers, and possibly KVs members too, did not see the difference; this is probably because they never formalized the PAYGO mechanism they were talking about.
Finally, Table 6 displays the ratio of the miners' and the mine owners' payments of contributions. Again, this is done from the perspective of the average small stagnant KV, the average medium stagnant KV, and so on. This should give some indication of how financing burdens were shared between employee and employer. As mentioned in Section 2, miners and mine owners shouldered claims costs jointly, but not necessarily in equal amounts. Until 1906, when financing on equal terms (50 per cent by each party) was introduced, employers usually covered a smaller portion of costs than insurants. In the long term, the miners' portion of costs did not decrease much. While their portion was 26 per cent higher than owners' in 1861, their portion was still 15 per cent higher in 1907; the average small stagnant KV obviously could not induce employers to take on greater financial responsibility. In contrast, the average medium stagnant, as well as medium dynamic, KV significantly lowered the miners' contributors relative to the employers'. Note: The ratio is calculated as (total miners' contributions/total employers' contributions).
Not for profit, but not without dividend: Implicit rates of return
In essence, the quantitative evidence presented above implies that KVs were broadly subjected to adjustment pressure owing to increasing system dependency. This state of affairs forced KVs to react according to the PAYGO equation. Whether fiscal adjustments were due to conscious and planned or accidental action, they had direct consequences for economic outcomes. The outcome of interest for this paper is the extent of intergenerational redistribution. Like a government, every KV faced an intertemporal budget restriction. Over a KV's operating lifetime, discounted costs must have equalled discounted benefits and initial financial reserves. That is to say, present miners' overconsumption of insurance benefits compared to what has been contributed constrains the amount of benefits consumable by future miners relative to contributions. From the point of view of a representative insured miner, changes in his KV's business policy towards higher contributions or lower income replacement of the invalidity pension benefit must have necessarily had a direct impact on the dividend he could earn by being insured there. Paying contributions to the KV was an investment yielding either a positive rate of return, when lifetime invalidity pension benefits exceeded lifetime contribution payments, or a negative rate of return, when discounted contributions were higher than discounted pension benefits. Ideally, all insured miners who exhibited the same insurance history-that is, an equal number of years of contribution payments and years of retirement-but entered the KV in different years over the course of 1861 to 1913, had earned the same implicit rate of return. According to our experience today, though, I expect to find that implicit rates of return fell over time.
When it reads above that the KVs' invalidity insurance and modern old-age insurance work the same way, this appears to be essentially correct. However, from a technical point of view, there is a difference that has to be mentioned. Invalidity could have occurred at any age:
On the one hand, a miner could have entered the mining sector and a KV at age 25, have become disabled at age 30, and have received a pension for 20 years; on the other hand, a miner could have paid contributions for 35 years, have been unmarried, and have died before he qualified for a pension. These extremes constitute a continuum of many possible individual insurance histories. However, I have chosen to focus on one scenario that might be quite representative for the average insured miner: 25 years of service and contributions, followed by a five-year retirement period. For each KV that was in operation sufficiently long between 1861 and 1913, I calculate the interest rate that leads to equality of discounted contributions and discounted pension benefits. This rate of return is calculated for three entrance cohorts:
1861, 1871, and 1881. Because of the lack of data on age-specific contributions and age- Table 7 shows estimated implicit rates of return for 52 out of 103 Prussian KVs. In addition to the funds' names and the rates of return, displayed in brackets is the number of full years of retirement a miner having entered in 1871 or 1881 must have additionally experienced in order to receive a rate of return that is not less than the 1861 cohort's rate. This is an important piece of information because the straightforward model used does not itself adjust for gains in longevity; in my framework, I call this effect the longevity compensation. The information depicted in Table 7 needs careful interpretation because results were derived essentially on the basis of a statistical construct. The results, however, have several noteworthy implications. First, in comparison to entrance cohorts 1871 and 1881, the representative miner having entered in 1861 was extremely well-off in the majority of cases.
This holds broadly across all long-term growth patterns. The variance is, however, lowest for the largest KVs. An initial real rate of return of 7.86 per cent (Halberger KV), for example, fits perfectly into the picture drawn in the previous subsection and matches contemporaries'
worries about solvency and sustainability (see the citations of Caron and Imbusch above). Yet in order to derive a more robust judgement of whether KVs redistributed financing burdens to future generations, we need to take the longevity-compensation information into account. The number in brackets in Table 7 tells us for how many additional full years a miner of the respective entrance cohort would have needed to receive his pension to realize a rate of return not below the reference rate of the 1861 cohort. Therefore, I try to take gains in longevity into account. In order to get an impression of the extent of gains in longevity, I refer to data on average pension duration. Unfortunately, these data are available beginning only in 1900. As reference, I consider data on the largest KVs. Table 8 shows the average invalidity pension duration for those KVs for selected years, as well as the average change in that duration. In all but one case, the Halberstadt KV, the average annual change in the pension duration is positive over the period 1900 to 1913.
Let us first have a look at the dynamic large KVs. The KV statistics display the average invalidity pension duration in year t as the number of years, the invalids that died in that particular year, received their pension on average.
With regard to the KVs that did not maintain a U-shaped pattern, the longevitycompensation information indicates that they had redistributed financing burdens towards later generations of miners. Take, for example, the Rüdersdorf KV. It is not impossible from an ex post perspective that the representative miner of entrance cohort 1871 might have received two additional years of pension to experience the same rate of return as the 1861 cohort. However, it appears impossible that the representative miner of 1881 received a pension for additional nine years or more. Actually, the expression '9+' says in most cases that a longevity compensation of more than ten years would have been necessary to treat the 1861 entrance cohort equal to the 1861 entrance cohort. All the KVs facing such a calculated compensation are not likely to have maintained the same implicit rate of return over time.
Interestingly, this finding holds for stagnant KVs as well as for dynamic small and medium
KVs. This implies that sustaining the same rate of return was not only a matter of simply having been on a long-term growth path, but also a matter of having started with a large size.
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Conclusion
This paper investigates the German miners' social insurance funds, the Knappschaften, and their provision of members with pay-as-you-go invalidity pensions. The way they dealt with pension provision between 1854 and 1913 and the economic outcomes they produced have not yet been researched in detail. It has been shown that the miners and their employers, who, altogether, operated the mutual and non-profit funds, faced a fundamental economic problem, one that this paper assesses from a firm-level perspective: the rising relative burden from economically dependent pensioners. This economic problem is nowadays often claimed to be the main challenge to modern welfare states. During the study period, pressure on finances forced the Knappschaften to adjust their fiscal policy, using a mix of raising contributions and lowering the pension level.
The news here is that the nineteenth century Knappschaften's business policy displays the general financial weakness of pay-as-you-go systems, but also the importance of growth.
Evidence on implicit rates of return supports the conclusion that dynamic large KVs, the ones that operated the schemes in the most important and prospering mining areas (the Ruhr, Silesian, and Saar coal fields; the Mansfeld ore and Harz coal and ore fields), sustained an intergenerationally balanced policy in which differences in implicit rates of return between entrance cohorts by and large disappeared if gains in longevity are taken into account. In contrast, the majority of small and medium-sized KVs, regardless of whether they stagnated or grew in the long term, redistributed financing burdens intergenerationally towards the future. To say it in a pointed way: Since, at the start of the Knappschaftens' occupational insurance system, initial generations of miners were able to capitalize on their membership more extensively than was reasonable ex post, later generations of miners paid the price in the form of reduced consumption possibilities. References to contemporary observers reveal not only their worries about these intertemporal distributional effects, but also their concerns about the long-term stability of the miners' implicit intergenerational contract-thus about threats to solidarity. Thus, the problems with the PAYGO system that we usually attribute only to the modern, advanced welfare state of the second half of the twentieth century were already quite evident in the nineteenth century Knappschaften. 11. I chose to define only these three size-class intervals because nearly all KVs easily fit into one of these three classes; regarding the entire study period, each KV was put in exactly one size class and remained in it.
12. This is my own translation of the German original: "Die Thatsache, dass es unmöglich ist, mit so geringen Beiträgen wie bisher auf die Dauer so hohe Pensionen wie bisher zu gewähren, ist eben unumstösslich. Jedenfalls aber dürfte es besser sein, etwas geringere Pensionen mit voller Sicherheit für alle Zeit zu gewähren, als eine momentan günstige Lage dadurch zu erkaufen, dass man die Zukunft um so stärker belastet."
13. The income replacement rate estimates displayed in Table 5 are definitely not comparable to rates that many present-day schemes, especially in the developed countries, provide; depending on the relative income position, the German system granted, around 1992, a net replacement rate of between 53 and 77 per cent (Börsch-Supan, 1992, p. 539) . This observation can be explained by the fact that the concept of an individual's lifetime as split into three stages-youth, employment, and retirement-had not really broken through in the nineteenth century, even not with Bismarckian old-age insurance. So, nineteenth and early twentieth century contemporaries may not have identified a pension as self-standing retirement income (because gainful employment during invalidity and family insurance had still played a major role) and, hence, had not advocated high replacement rates (Conrad, 1991; Hardach, 2003, pp. 6-7; Kaschke, 2000) .
14. This is my own translation of the German original: "Dieselbe [die jeweilige Leistungsfähigkeit eines KV, Anm. des Verf.] beruht nicht darauf, dass etwa in einem Jahre oder während einer
Reihe von Jahren die dann gerade auszuzahlenden Pensionen aufgebracht werden können. Die
Knappschaftsvereine sind vielmehr nur dann fähig, zu irgendeiner Zeit Pensionen in einer bestimmten Höhe zu leisten, wenn zugleich rechnungsmässig feststeht, dass sie stets die gleichen 15. The data situation is quite good, but not optimal. The Prussian KV statistics offer a range of statistical information on KVs, but also lack some that are important for this paper. So, until 1913 , I lack data on the average age at which a miner first joined a KV and, until 1899, lack data on the average length of service, the average pension duration (number of years for which a pension was paid), and the average age at death of the invalidity pensioners.
16. Not displayed are implicit rates of return for entrance cohorts 1886 and 1891 that allow especially for the effect of war and post-war inflation. Basically, rates fit into the picture since they are much lower for almost all KVs than rates depicted above. So, the secular trend of diminishing rates of return can be traced beyond the year 1913.
17. A final note on widows' and orphans' pension is necessary. I have not taken them into account here. However, because of the fact that widows' pensions usually made up 50 per cent of the invalidity pension, we simply have to double the longevity compensation in order to get an impression of how many years a miner's widow had to receive her pension if her husband died after five years of retirement
